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Scarcely had the members of the convention completed
their labors and gone to their homes when the legislature
began to seek means of escaping either wholly or in part
from the fetters, which had been put upon it. The members were forbidden to pass any local or special law concerning cities. They felt, however, and perhaps rightly
that it would be impossible to pass general laws which
would serve to supply a scheme of municipal government
suitable for cities of all sizes. Therefore they passed the
act of 1874, which divided the cities of the state into three
classes upon the basis of their population, the theory being
that a law which applies to all cities of a certain size in the
state is general and not special.
By the terms of the act all cities of over 3oo,ooo inhabitants should constitute the first class. Those between ioo,ooo and 3ooooo the second class. Those between io,ooo
and ioo,ooo the third class. Philadelphia was the only
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city of the first class. The act then proceeded to legislate
for cities of the first class, or in fact for Philadelphia.
The constitutionality of the act was promptly attacked in
W'heeler v. Philadelphia,and the case reached the Supreme
Court in 1875. It is reported in 77 Pa. 338. Mr. Justice
Paxson delivered the opinion of the court. The precise question raised was whether it was lawful for the legislature
to authorize an increase of the municipal indebtedness of
cities of the first class, which in this case meant Philadelphia.
The court said:
"If the complainants were right in their position in
regard to the classification of cities, and that the act classifying cities is a special act, applicable to Philadelphia alone,
it would not help them. The legislature is authorized by
the express terms of the constitution, to empower by special
act a city to increase its debt. The language of that instrument is, 'but any city, the debt of which exceeds 7 per centum,
may be authorized by law to increase the same.' It was
entirely competent for the legislature to have passed an act
authorizing the City of Philadelphia, by name, to increase
its debt."
From this language it is seen that the question was
decided in the affirmative for an unassailable reason. This
was quite sufficient ground for the decision. The court,
however, went very fully into the question of the constitutionality of such a classification as was provided in the act
and upheld it.
The decision as to this point was put upon the broad
ground that legislation for a class of cities is not special and
the fact that there was but one city of the first or second
class was a mere incident which would be changed in future
by the natural development of the smaller cities.
The court said that the constitution itself sanctions classification about kindred subjects and recognizes the necessity
for it. The true question, it was said, "is not whether classification is authorized by the terms of the constitution but
whether it is expressly prohibited." There being no such
express prohibition, it was thought justifiable to assume
that the framers of the constitution contemplated such a
possibility when the clause forbidding local and special legislation was incorporated into our constitution.
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The strongest plea which moved the court, however, seems
to have been the plea of necessity. The following language
of Mr. Justice Paxson will explain their views on this phase
of the question:
"If the classification of cities is in violation of the constitution, it follows, of necessity, that Philadelphia as a city
of the first class must be denied the legislation necessary
to its present prosperity and future development, or that
the small inland cities must be burdened with legislation
wholly unsuited to their needs. For if the constitution meant
what the complainants aver that it does, Philadelphia can
have nolegis.atinn that is not common to all other cities of
the state. And for this there is absolutely no remedy, but
a change in the organic law itself.
This is a serious question. We have but to turn to the
statute book to realize the vast amount of legislation in the
past, special to the city of Philadelphia. We speak not now
of what is popularly known as special legislation, private
acts, etc., but of proper legislation affecting the whole city,
and indispensable to its prosperity. We may instance the
laws in regard to the quarantine, lazaretto, Board of health,
and other matters connected with the sanitary condition of
the city, the laws in regard to shipping and pilotage, as
affecting its commerce; laws concerning its trade, such as
those that relate to mercantile appraisers, inspectors of flour,
bark, beef and pork, butter and lard, domestic distilled
spirits, flaxseed, leather, tobacco, petroleum; and the laws
in regard to building inspectors; the storage and sale of
gunpowder; laws affecting its political condition, as by the
division and subdivision of wards, and the establishing of
a ratio of representation in councils. We have but to glance
at this legislation to see that the most of it is wholly unsuited
to small inland cities, and that to inflict it upon them would
be little short of a calamity. Must the city of Scranton, over
one hundred miles from tide-water, with a stream hardly
large enough to float a batteau, be subjected to quarantine
regulations, and have its lazaretto? Must the legislation
for a great commercial and manufacturing city, with a population approaching I,ooo,ooo be regulated by the wants or
necessities of an inland city of Io,ooo inhabitants? If the
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constitution answers this question affirmatively, we are bound
by it, however much we might question its wisdom. But no
such construction is to be gathered from its terms, and we
will not presume that the framers of that instrument, or the
people who ratified it, intended that the machinery of their
state government should be so bolted and riveted down by the
fundamental law as to be unable to move and perform its
necessary functions."
Before assuming that classification is constitutional, as
under our decisions it undoubtedly is, and proceeding to the
discussion of the limitation of the doctrine, it is proper to
briefly examine the views of the framers of the constitution,
to see whether they in fact did contemplate the possibility
of classification and if so whether in their opinion it would
be proper. It may be thought a useless proceeding to resurrect such a question now when our decisions are unanimous
in upholding classification, but it is here referred to for two
reasons. First for its historical interest and second because
even if the main principle be established, there is yet the
very vital question of the extent of the doctrine and the
views of these men are always pertinent in deciding that
question.
The evil and the remedy contemplated by the convention
have already been discussed. The purpose being to prevent
the promotion of private interests for corrupt motives, it
may be said, on the one hand, that that purpose is very largely
met by preventing legislation for particular persons or localities, though permitting it for classes and, on the other, that
to permit classification at all throws such a discretionary
power into the hands of the legislature, that it can with
impunity enact a great deal of legislation really local and
special in its nature.
At the time when the decision of Wheeler v. Philadelphia,
was rendered, the former argument was entitled to the
greater weight, inasmuch as the vicious laws enacted prior
to that time were laws dealing not with classes but with
individuals, and hence any danger from legislation applying
to the former would be purely speculative.
On first reading of the clause in question, Mr. Mantor
arose to express his views. He does not even by indirection
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touch upon the question of classification, but by careful reading of his language one can perhaps form a view as to
whether he would have deemed it compatible with the prohibition. The fact that with one exception, I think, the
members did not discuss it would indicate that they did not
directly contemplate that it would be attempted. Mr. Mantor
said:
"Now, sir, nothing will strike the people of this state with
as much force as this question of barring special legislation,
that the people feel more interest in this one subject than
any other which this convention will be called upon to decide.
I would therefore say that equal privileges for all, exclusive
privileges for none, should be the sentiment of every citizen
of this Commonwealth. If we depart from this principle
we are at sea without a chart or compass. A general law
granting privileges to incorporate companies, is made for the
benefit of the people of the state; the privileges granted
thereby may be enjoyed by all the people of every locality
in the state. There can be no special monopoly created by
pursuing this course. No company can be organized under
general laws which can occupy any particular locality or
carry on any particular kind of business to the exclusion of
all other companies for the same purpose. I am in favor
of adopting a principle into our constitution which will permit all people to combine with the same privileges. I would
not give to the legislature, through this constitution, power
to grant privileges to which all persons are not equally entitled under general law. I would place a restriction on the
legislation in this Commonwealth, and say to it, thus far
and no farther, so that if one man points his finger at you,
and says, 'I have a right and privilege under such a law,'
.
you can answer him, 'so have I.'
"We have not been studying the interests of all the people,
but through these special grantings we have been widening
the breach that has divided us. Philadelphia, the first city
in the state, and second to but one in the Union, is beginning
to wake up to a broader idea of commercial wealth. So far
as this state is concerned, it has been but a few years since
she began to realize that, west of the Alleghenies, in this state,
were some possessions enclosed in the Commonwealth, of
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which she but formed a part, and where there was large
business interests in which she should long since have been
a partner.
"But, as a Pennsylvanian, I take great pride in speaking
of Philadelphia as our city, and can but hope that every law
passed, after adopting this constitution, shall be so broad,
so completely affecting all interests on every subject of like
character over the state, that it will cement our commercial
relations, and that in the future we shall act with a oneness
of purpose for the good of all."-II. Constitutional Debates,
590, 591.

The last paragraph quoted would seem to indicate that
Mr. Mantor thought general laws would govern both Philadelphia and the cities west of the Alleghenies, as of course
they do for some purposes.
Two amendments were offered and adopted during the
course of the discussion of this section which are pertinent.
As first reported all local or special legislation "relating to
or incorporating ferries or bridges" was forbidden. It was
objected that this would prevent the legislature from enacting laws relating only to bridges crossing navigable streams
on the boundary between this commonwealth and other
states. It does not appear incontestably whether the objecting member, Mr. Lear, thought a separate act of legislation
for each bridge would be necessary or whether he thought a
law applying to all such bridges would be satisfactory for
them, but forbidden as being local. If the former was the case
there is no special significance in his amendment. But if the
latter was his supposition, then it would seem clear that
without the exception (which was incorporated in the constitution), any law relating to all bridges over such bounding streams, would be unconstitutional.
Mr. Lear's remarks supporting his amendment are reported in II. Constitutional Debates, 595- Mr. Struthers
in support, said:
"Mr. Chairman, I think we ought to have the amendment
of the gentleman from Bucks (Mr. Lear) incorporated in
that paragraph. It may be that New Jersey would be willing, under the compact existing between that state and this,
to pass a law with relation to bridges crossing the Delaware
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River, and that they would say in that law that it shall take
effect when similar legislation shall be passed by the State
of Pennsylvania. Without this amendment, if you adopt
this clause, that legislation by Pennsylvania to correspond
with the legislation in New Jersey, could not be had."-II.
Constitutional Debates, 597.
Mr. Cochran's remarks were as follows:
"Mr. Chairman: I understand the amendment offered by
the gentleman from Allegheny (Mr. D. N. White), which
contains the words 'within this state,' to be intended to meet
the objection with regard to this provision interfering with
the building of bridges across the Delaware River, between
the states of New Jersey and Pennsylvania. I understand
the idea to be to so limit this paragraph as not to prevent the
legislature from authorizing the building of bridges in common across the Delaware or any other stream which is the
common boundary between this and any other state. If it
has that effect the amendment of the gentleman from Bucks
is entirely proper."-II. Constitutional Debates, 597.
This clause as finally adopted is:
"The General Assembly shall not pass any local or special
law, relating to ferries or bridges, or incorporating ferry or
bridge companies, except for the erection of bridges crossing
streams which form boundaries between this and any other
state."
The bridges excepted form a distinct class. As the exception marks the extent of the power, it may be argued that
without the exception no laws relating to the excepted class
could be enacted. This would indicate that in the case of
the incorporation of bridge companies at least classification
is forbidden. Such a classification in the case of bridges
has, however, been upheld.
The following colloquy which took place between several
members serves to show what their ideas were as to the effect
of the prohibition of local or special legislation fixing the
rate of interest:
"The clerk read as follows: 'Fixing the rate of interest.'
"Mr. Darlington.-Mr. Chairman: I want to know from
the committee on legislation what that means?
"Mr. Corbett.-Mr. Chairman: It means to prohibit all
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special laws fixing a special rate of interest, not to allow
interest to be fixed by anything except a general law.
"Mr. Darlington.-Mr. Chairman: I want still to inquire
whether the purpose is to prohibit a city, county or borough
from borrowing money at one rate of interest, where they
can get it at that rate, and to allow to another city to borrow
at another rate of interest.
"Mr. Corbett.-Mr. Chairman: I apprehend it applies to
a city, corporation or person, to every person alike, and to
every person, corporation, city or borough; it says no rate
of interest shall be fixed by special law. The law must be
general.
"Mr. Darlington.-Mr. Chairman: Then I submit that it
is impracticable in its operations, and for this reason: You
cannot obtain money for a city like Corry or like Pittsburg
even, at the same rate at which it can be obtained in Philadelphia. This is an attempt it seems to me, to deny to a city
or town with less ability, and less power, and less capacity,
to borrow money at all, unless it can do so at a rate at which
it is impossible to obtain it.
"What is the use of such a clause? What good is to be
attained by it? Why should not any community be allowed
to borrow money from its citizens, and why should not the
citizens be allowed to loan it to that community at any rate
of interest they can agree upon, whether it is 5 or 7 per cent?
Why should we prohibit them from borrowing at all because
they cannot get it at the same rate that other cities can? . . .
"Mr. Mann.-Mr. Chairman: I desire only to say one
word in addition to what has been said by the gentleman
from Allegheny, and that is that this clause was agreed
upon by the committee on legislation to prevent theverything
that the gentleman from Chester (Mr. Darling-ton) advocates. The committee thought that it was better that the
legislature, by a general law, should allow any city to contract such rates of interest as it has authorized them to do
under a general act, and not to allow one city to pay one
rate of interest, and another city a different rate. That was
the very purpose we designed to prevent. We want, by a
general act, to define this whole question of interest upon
some sensible plan, which has yet never been done. There
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are now in this state saving funds and banks having rates of
interest from 6 all the way up to io per cent, according to
the charters granted by the legislature. One year the legislature will pass these charters and allow the banks to charge
io per.cent interest per annum, and the next pass another
law, restricting them to 6 per cent. Such banks -are in
existence in this state, and it should be remedied, and it
cannot be remedied by any other provision than just this
one. I have heard it stated that we are to have a report
from another committee which will supplant this; but untilwe have it, let us adopt this paragraph as it stands."-IL.
Constitutional Debates, 6o8.
The language of these gentlemen leaves little room to doubt
that they thought all cities, large and small, must be governed by one law fixing the rate of interest and yet the power
to borrow money and pay interest on it is a corporate power
and under our decisions any law relating to the corporate
powers of cities of a particular class is valid.
Upon the second reading, the clause prohibiting local or
special legislation "relating to cemeteries, graveyards or
public grounds" was amended by adding the words "not
of the state." Mr. Biddle then proposed another amendment, and the following discussion took place:
"Mr. Biddle.-Then I move to amend the amendment by
adding the words 'or of public municipalities.'
"Mr. Harry White.-I regret to differ with the dis-"
tinguished gentleman from Philadelphia (Mr. Biddle), to
whose views I always give great deference, but I would
suggest to him that it was just to meet this class of cases
that this section was designed. It was to prevent any local
or special legislation relative to particular localities, and to
require them to conform, as far as practicable, to a general
law. I apprehend there will be no difficulty whatever in
framing'a general law on this subject that will wisely and
equitably regulate these matters for municipalities.
"Mr. Biddle.-I am not at all clear that the reasons given
by the distinguished gentleman from Indiana meet the case
that I am about to put. It may be very expedient to pass
a special law relating to the municipality of Philadelphia or
Pittsburg, or of any other city or borough of the state, and
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I cannot see any objection to it. It would be impossible to
meet these cases by general law. I cannot understand how
a general law would meet the particular necessities which
would be required here in Philadelphia, or in Pittsburg, or in
Erie, or in other parts of the state."
There might be something, for instance, eminently proper
with regard to the park of this city which would not apply
to any other part of the state. Why should not such a law
be passed? It is to be supposed that the representatives of
the people from a particular locality will carefully watch the
legislation respecting that locality and prevent injurious
legislation. It may be most expedient to have a special law
passed, and yet this paragraph would prevent it.
"On the question of agreeing to the amendment to the
amendment, a division was called for, which resulted twentyone in the affirmative. This being less than a majority of a
quorum, the amendment to the amendment was rejected."V. Constitutional Debates, 257.
If a law were passed giving cities of the first class certain
powers over their public lands, it would fully meet Mr. Biddle's objections, yet he did not, apparently contemplate such

a possibility.
During the discussion concerning the rate of interest occurred the only direct reference to the subject of classification that I have seen in the report of the debates. The part
of it which is material is as follows:
"Mr. Dallas.-But sir, if it were otherwise-if it were
true that we cannot continue to enjoy those conveniences
which we have under corporate power, and cannot create
others without this special inducement to people to put their
capital into corporate enterprises-still this paragraph of
the section should pass, because it would not prevent the
legislature from hereafter passing any general law-applicable alike to individuals or corporations, by which any man
or association of men seeking to build a railroad, or to establish a line of steamships, if you please, might go into the
market and offer special inducements to lenders in order to
borrow money. There would be nothing in this paragraph
that would prevent it. The legislature, in their wisdom, if
they discover that special interests of the state require this
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sort of fostering in order to enable them to obtain necessary
capital, can at any time say so. If they should think-I do
not say so now-but if hereafter the legislature should think
it necessary to say that for the use of every railroad enterprise (corporate or otherwise) io per cent may be given for
money, they may do so as well after the adoption of this
paragraph as now.
"I want this paragraph adopted, because as the constitution stands now, the power to obtain this special privilege
is not dependent upon the class of the enterprise but upon the
character of the individual who asks it. Corporations can
obtain the right to borrow money at 1o per cent, if they
choose, and for any purpose whatever; whereas nobody ever
heard of any individual procuring the same privilege, for
any object under the sun. What is the reason for this distinction? Why should this privilege be made to depend, in
the future as in the past, upon whether those who desire it
are incorporated or not?"'-II. Constitutional Debates, 261.
"Mr. Darlington.-Mr. President: I do not propose to
enter at length into the argument on this question; but I
wish to point out one of the errors into which the gentleman
from Philadelphia, in my apprehension, falls. He proposes
to abolish all special legislation on the subject of capital.
In other words, no association of individuals for any improving purpose, whether it be to develop the country in mines,
manufactures, or in any other manner, shall ever have the
privilege to acquire capital by paying a larger amount of
interest than any individual may pay; and he says, should
it become necessary, that they should have relief of this kind.
"If I understand the gentleman from Philadelphia, he
proposes to get over the difficulty of special legislation by
allowing the legislature to say that all railroad companies
may borrow, or all improvement companies may borrow,
or all canal companies may borrow, but you shall not allow
the A. or B. or C. company to borrow; and that is the way
by which he says he gets rid of the difficulty of special legislation. Now I want to call the attention of the convention
to the idea which I think is well founded, that no such legislation could be permitted for an instant without being obnoxious to the charge of special legislation, legislation for a
class of individuals.
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"Mr. Dallas.-May I be allowed to explain.
"Mr. Darlington.-I have no objection.
"Mr. Dallas.-The gentleman has entirely misunderstood
me. My suggestion was that the legislature might by general law provide that any particular industry or class of
business might have a special rate if in the wisdom of the
legislature it was proper, but not that any class of individuals, as a corporation, of men over thirty years of age.
"Mr. Darlington.-I understand the gentleman perfectly,
and I think I understand the answer to it. The moment
you allow the legislature to favor a particular class of interest, you are favoring the individuals engaged in that class
and pursuit. In other words, you are specially legislating
for a set of individuals engaged in a particular business,
whether it be in the floating of steamships, the making of
railroads, the developing of iron ore or coal or other thing.
You may aid the interest of coal or iron or commerce, but
you shall not aid the interest of railroads.
"Now, I take it this convention will understand what any
man who reads can understand, that you cannot under any
prohibition of special legislation evade that provision by
saying that cities of a certain class or population shall be
allowed to borrow, or that persons engaged in the business of
mining for coal or iron may borrow, or that persons engaged
in the business of building railroads may borrow at a higher
rate of interest than others. This is all special legislation
and will be entirely prohibited by such a clause in the constitution. Gentlemen must not fancy, therefore, that they can
prohibit the legislature from doing what is right to be done,
if it is right to do that which I suppose everyone will agree it
is right to do-allow even members of a corporation to borrow at a higher rate of interest than others may choose to
give."-II. Constitutional Debates, 262.
"Mr. Knight.-Mr. President: I am in favor of leaving
this paragraph as originally passed, and I trust the convention will allow it to remain as it is. I believe it is the interest
of the people of the state that we should have a uniform general law on the subject, that every man and every corporation
should be put upon the same platform, and when the people
are sufficiently enlightened as to the difficulties under which
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we are now laboring, they may come to our rescue and give
us something that will benefit all alike. I trust that the
reconsideration will not be carried and that the paragraph
will remain as originally passed by the convention."-II.
Constitutional Debates, 263.
The effect of this section will be
.
.
"Mr. Mann.in favor of particular
legislation
simply to prevent special
itself to that
has
committed
classes. I think this convention
principle, that hereafter all classes are to stand upon the
same footing. Individuals are obliged to go into the market
and sell their bonds now, and have been ever since the law
regulating the rate of interest was passed, and there is no
more difficulty in railroads doing that than there is in other
individuals doing it. It does seem to me, that all the objections raised to this paragraph are groundless, and that we
shall be stultifying ourselves if we refuse to adopt it as it
stands"-II. Constitutional Debates, 264,
Mr. Dallas' remarks disclose the fact that he thought
laws relating to all corporations engaged in a particular
business would be general. Mr. Darlington repudiated
this view and was particulary emphatic in his statement
that law for classes of cities could not be tolerated. Messrs.
Knight and Mann evidently agreed with him.
That a law applying, for instance, to all insurance companies is general if appropriate for them alone seems very
clear; it is difficult to see upon what ground the opposite
view can be argued. There is no reason, save the remarks
just quoted, to believe that there was any opposition to such
a view among the members of the convention.
The theory for upholding the classification of cities is not
so plain. The foregoing remarks of the members tend to the
view that if they contemplated such a classification they disapproved of it. While under the decisions in our own state
and in other states whose constitutions also forbid local and
special legislation, classification of cities is fully upheld, yet
when we come to discuss the limitation of the doctrine, it
may be valuable to remember that the evidence points to the
conclusion that the constitutional convention did intend to
restrain the legislature from making such a classification.
The theory upon which the doctrine of classification in
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general rests is undoubtedly a sound one. The requirement
that all laws upon certain subjects shall be general, does
not mean that every law shall affect every person and place
in the Commonwealth. It means merely that it shall operate
equally upon all persons or places to which it appropriately
applies. Thus a law applying to all male citizens over
twenty-one years of age, does not affect everybody in the
Commonwealth, and yet will be valid provided its subject
matter be such that it could not appropriately apply to other
persons. So a law applying to all cities over a certain population is said to be general, because it extends to all cities of
that population in the commonwealth without discrimination,
and the fact that there may be but one city of that size, has
been held immaterial. Again it should be noticed, the act
must be of such a nature that it cannot, without being burdensome and oppressive, apply to cities of a different size.
An excellent definition of a general law is given in the
1
New Jersey case of Van Ripper v. Parsons,
where it was
said: "A law framed in general terms, restricted to no locality, and operating equally upon all of a group of objects
which, having regard to the purpose of the legislature, are
distinguished by characteristics sufficiently marked and important to make them a class by themselves, is not a special
or local law but a general law, without regard to the consideration that within this state there happens to be but
one individual of that class, or one place where it produces
effects."
2
In Wheeler v. Philadelphia,
Mr. Justice Paxson said:
"Without entering at large upon the discussion of what is
here meant by a 'local or special law,' it is sufficient to say,
that a statute which relates to persons or things as a class,
is a general law, while a statute which relates to particular
persons or things of a class is special, and comes within the
constitutional prohibition."
These remarks apply rather to the word "special" than
"local."
Local legislation is properly legislation which is
permanently confined to a particular locality. Any such
24o

N. J. L. 123.

'Supra.
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law is bad. There can be no question of classification here
in a proper sense. The very essence of the theory of classification of cities is that the law deals with corporate powers
delegated to them, not as occupants of particular territory,
but as municipal corporations which, by reason of their
size, have peculiar needs, and-that all cities wherever-situated
are entitled to the benefits of the law. On the other hand, a
local law is one whose operation is confined to a particlar
locality as such. If we will keep this thought in mind it will
serve to clear up some apparently obscure distinctions
between various laws which have from time to time been
placed upon the statute books.
By a study of Wheeler v. Phila.,3 we can see that the
limits to the theory of the classification of cities were made
no less plain than the theory itself.
These limitations as there explained are:
I. The class to which the law applies must be so distinguished and set apart from ' other cities that legislation for
the class affected would be burdensome and oppressive for
the others.
It follows that if the law can operate equally upon all
classes without being burdensome and oppressive, then if
confined to a single class it is unconstitutional.
2. The classification must provide for the future, i. e.,
must be of such a character that other individuals may enter
the class by natural development and may thereby come
under the benefit of the law.
This is indicated by the language of Mr. Justice Paxson
in Wheeler v. Phila., where he says:
"Legislation is intended not only to meet the wants of the
present, but to provide for the future. It deals not with the
past, but in theory at least, anticipates the needs of a state,
healthy with a vigorous development. It is intended to be
permanent. At no distant day Pittsburg will probably
become a city of the first class; and Scranton, or others of
the rapidly growing interior towns, will take the place of
the city of Pittsburg, as a city of the second class. In the
meantime, is the classification as to cities of the first class
' Supra.
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bad because Philadelphia is the only one of the class? We
think not. Classification does not depend upon numbers.
The first man, Adam, was as distinctly a class, when the
breath of life was breathed into him, as at any subsequent
period. The word is used not to designate numbers, but a
rank or order, of persons or things; in society it is used to
indicate equality, or persons distinguished by common characteristics, as the trading classes; the laboring classes; in
science, it is a division or arrangement, containing the subordinate divisions of order, genus and species."
In Davis v. Clark,4 this second limitation was disregarded. In that case it appeared that an act had been passed
which excluded from its terms all counties having more
than two hundred thousand inhabitants. It was contended
that the act was within the decision of Wheeler v. Philadelphia, and should be upheld as a classification of counties.
But the court decided that the act was local because it permanently excluded Philadelphia and Allegheny counties
from its terms. If counties by natural growth should become members of the excepted class they would thereby
lose instead of gain the benefit of the law. And what seems
to have weighed most with the court, there was no provision
by which Philadelphia or Allegheny Counties could ever
become subject to the law, inasmuch as it could not be
assumed that they would ever grow less in population.
Mr. Justice Mercur said:
"By the terms of this act, the laborers in the two most
populous counties of the state, although they perform the
same kind of labor, are as effectually debarred from its operation as if those counties were designated by name, or were
outside of the boundaries of the state. It gives to laborers
in some counties rights, powers and privileges, which it
denies to the same class of laborers, performing the same
kind of labor in other counties. It is not only local and
special, but odious in its discrimination. It is in most clear
and palpable violation of the constitution, which expressly
withholds from the legislature all power to create or extend
a lien by a local and special law.
' io6 Pa. 377 (1884).
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"The difficulty here is not that of classification only;
within reasonable limits, and for some purposes classification is allowable. It has been sustained on the basis of
population of counties on the assumption that those having
a small population, may ultimately have one much larger.
Here the larger are excluded. We cannot assume that their
population will ever be reduced to less than the number
named. They are, therefore, practically and permanently
excluded by the intent and purpose of this act, which is
special in its terms and local in its effect."
It would seem to follow from this decision that any law
which excludes certain portions of the commonwealth from
its terms, under such circumstances that there can be no
reasonable supposition that the excluded portions will ever
become subject to the law, is unconstitutional, e. g., a law
excluding all cities or counties above a certain population,
because it makes no provision by which the excluded portion may ever enjoy the benefits of the legislation, and
because such a law cannot in any just sense be said to be
classification at all. Its plain object is not to legislate for
the benefit of any particular class but to merely exempt
from its terms certain localities. This clearly is not within
the meaning of the classification theory. In Morrison v.
Bachert,5 an act excepting from its terms counties of more
than 15o,ooo and less than io,ooo inhabitants was declared
to be unconstitutional. Mr. Justice Paxson said:
"That the act in question is in direct conflict with the
constitution is too plain for argument. It is only necessary
to read the title to this act to see this. It excludes perpetually from its operation all counties having a population
of over 150,000 inhabitants. This makes it a local law.
If it can exclude Philadelphia and Pittsburg, it may exclude
every other county in the state but the one county seeking
such special or local legislation."
In City of Scranton v. Silkman,6 an act gave certain
rights of appeal to litigants in all counties of less than
500.000 inhabitants.
It was shown that in all counties
112

Pa.

322

(i886).

113 Pa. 191 (1886).
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over 500,000 inhabitants, such a right of appeal already
existed, and hence there was a valid reason for the exception, but the court said this fact could not save the law.
Mr. Justice Green said:
"The right of appeal, asserted by the defendant in error
in this case, is given only to the owners of real estate in
counties of less than 500,000 inhabitants.
The act of
twenty-fourth of May, 1878, which gives this right is therefore of limited application, and comes within our ruling in
the case of Davis v. Clark, in which he held that the exclusion of a single county from the operation of the act makes
it local. There is, no doubt, much force in the consideration
that the only county which is now excluded has a system
of appeal of its own, and the present law practically makes
the right general which was before local. But the difficulty
we experience is that we cannot consistently hold a principle of construction applicable in one case and not applicable
in another where the same conditions exist. It is perhaps
unfortunate that we are obliged to apply the doctrine of
Davis v. Clark, to the present case, because we thereby deprive a large class of citizens of a valuable privilege. But
the remedy is with the legislature and not with us."
In Wilkesbarre v. Meyers,7 an act enlarging the civil
jurisdiction of justices of the peace except in cities of the
first class, was upheld because the constitution itself excepts
Philadelphia from the power of the legislature in this respect. The court said the act would have been valid had
Philadelphia, instead of cities of the first class, been excepted,
and they construed the phrase to mean Philadelphia in fact
and thus upheld the law. It was also stated by the court
that had it not been for the constitutional exception the act
so drawn would undoubtedly have been invalid.
Not only will an act permanently excluding a portion of
the commonwealth from its operation be unconstitutional
because there can be no movement from one class to another,
but also any law which, though based upon a pretended
classification in reality, can apply to but one locality either
at present or in the future.
7113

Pa. 395 (1886).
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In Perkins v. Philadelphia,' the court declared unconstitutional the act of May 24, 1893, which was entitled:
"An act to abolish commissioners of public buildings and
to place all public buildings heretofore under the control of
such commissioners, under the -control of the department of
public works in cities of the first class."
The act as its title indicates applied only to cities of the
first class, which had at the date of its passage a public
building commission. Obviously the only city to which
the act ever could apply was Philadelphia, as it was the
only city of the first class which at the date of the passage
of the act had such a commission.
Mr. Justice Dean said, inter alia.
"The plaintiffs further aver that this bill violates section
7, article iii, of the constitution: 'The general assembly shall
not pass any local or special law .
. regulating the
affairs of counties, cities, townships, boroughs or school
districts.'
"This act purports to be a general law applicable to cities
of the first class. We have held, and now adhere to it,
that the legislature may lawfully classify cities for corporate purposes, and that an act to promote such purposes
is not local or special, merely because, at the date of its
passage, there was but one city to which it applied. But
it has been decided in case after case, since the constitution
of 1874 went into effect, in positive unmistakable language,
that if the act was intended to apply to but one particular
city, county or township, and was not intended to and could
never apply to any other, it was local and therefore unconstitutional. This act is nominally general; applies in terms
to cities of the first class; abolishes commissioners of public
buildings, for the use of courts and municipal purposes in
such cities, created by special acts of assembly, and places
all buildings heretofore under their control in the control
of the department of public works. At the date of its passage there was just one city, one set of commissioners, one
special act of assembly, one public building, to which it could
apply; from the very nature of the case, there never could
be another city in the first class to which the act could apply;
' 156 Pa. 539 (1893).
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ior it transfers to the department of public works buildings
heretofore under the control of such commissioners; no
matter how many cities come into this class, nor how soon
they reach it, this act cannot apply to them, for their affairs
have not heretofore been regulated by the special provisions
of any such act as that of 1870."
As before stated the theory that legislation for classes is
not special but general, rests upon the assumption that the
law may some time be enjoyed by any other city or county
as by natural increase in population it emerges from a lower
class into a higher. It follows that even though the law may
apply to more than one locality, if it does not make provision for such future increase, but is so framed that the
classes are fixed and no other cities or counties may in future
pass from one to another, it is invalid. Thus a classification
based wholly or in part upon geographical distinctions will
necessarily be rigid and unconstitutional. It was so held in
Com. v. Patton.9 Mr. Justice Paxson said in that case:
"The act of April 18, 1878, can hardly be said to be
a classification of counties. It is true it speaks of all counties of more than 6o,ooo inhabitants. But it goes on to say,
'And in which there shall be any city incorporated at the
time of the passage of this act with a population exceeding
8,ooo inhabitants, situate at a distance from the county seat
of more than twenty-seven miles by the usually traveled
road.' This is classification run mad. Why not say all
counties named Crawford, with a population exceeding
sixty thousand, that contain a city called Titusville with
a population of over eight thousand and situated twentyseven miles from the county seat. Or all counties with a
population of over sixty thousand, watered by a certain
river or bounded by a certain mountain. There can be no
proper classification of cities or counties to the perpetual
exclusion of all others. The learned judge finds the fact
that Crawford County is the only county in the state to
which the act of April 18, 1878, can apply at the present
time. Said act makes no provision for the future, in which
respect it differs from the act of 1874 which, in express
terms, provides for future cities and the expanding growth
'88 Pa. 258 (1878).
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of those now in existence. That is not classification which
merely designates one county in the commonwealth and
contain no provision by which any other county may by
reason of its increase of population in the future, come within
the class.
"We need not pursue the subject further. We are of
opinion that the legislation referred to is special and within
the prohibition of the constitution. This is decisive of the
case, and renders a discussion of the other points involved
unnecessary."
In Blankenberg v, Black, 10 an act was under discussion
where an attempt had been made to legislate for Philadelphia County by classifying all counties in the state into two
classes, viz: (I) counties which have their boundaries coextensive with cities of the first class; (2) all other counties.
The act was very properly held unconstitutional inter alia
because it made no provision for future growth. While
other counties may in future contain cities of the first class,
it does not follow that those cities will have boundaries coextensive with the county in which they are situated.
This decision condemning the so-called "Tax-Ripper" act,
carried with it several other acts of the same character which
had of late years been passed. The reason the classification
was thought by the legislature to be valid may have been
dtle in part to a dictum of the court in Bennett v. Norton,1 '
where President Judge Rice, of Lucerne County, in an
opinion afterward affirmed by the Supreme Court, said:
"But while it may not be probable, it is not impossible
that some other city of the commonwealth may become coextensive with the county."
Such a classification is unquestionably bad. Not only
does it make no provision for the future, but there is no
reasonable ground for making a distinction between counties of that kind and others. The pretended classification
was a manifest subterfuge.
Thomas Raeburn White.
(To be continued.)
" Not yet reported.
1
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Pa. 221 (895).

